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Introduction 
It is now commonplace to declare that we live in an age of rights.1 Indeed, it is fair to say that 
the global popularity of human rights has reached the point where, as Alan Gewirth phrases 
it, many people regard them as fundamental to the “civilizing and moralizing of human life.”2 
However, while no topic arguably is as vital to international ethics, questions remain about 
what our rights are, who is entitled to claim certain rights, and how these rights should be 
implemented and enforced. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide to the intricate 
relations between the institutional development of international human rights, the central 
ethical principles offered to support human rights norms, and the politics of human rights. To 
this end, I draw inspiration from recent attempts to understand the making of rights claims as 
performative social and political practices. On this understanding, I propose that, for us to 
attend properly to the political significance of claiming rights, we should approach human 
rights and dignity as the achievements of generative struggles for recognition. In the first 
section, I offer a brief account of the translation of the idea of human rights into international 
legal norms and political institutions, focusing on the International Bill of Human Rights. In 
the middle section, I bring analytical attention to bear upon the ethical underpinnings of 
international human rights, characterized in terms of the four pillars of dignity, liberty, 
equality, and solidarity. Finally, I offer some reflections on the ways by which rights claims 
are positioned, in performative terms, as emergent political struggles to achieve reciprocal 
recognition, equal status, and human dignity. 
 
The international human rights system 
Human rights are, by definition, universal in scope. This is because they are supposed to be 
the rights that persons have simply by virtue of being human, thereby extending to all human 
beings in all times and all places.3 Although the current idea of human rights derives from 
earlier philosophical and religious sources—most prominently the natural law and natural 
rights traditions that inspired the European Enlightenment and the revolutions of the 
eighteenth century—the contemporary human rights system and associated body of 
international law is a product of the second half of the twentieth century.4 There were some 
complementary exceptions of course, such as the various treaties to abolish the slave trade 
(1862, 1885, 1890) and the Geneva (1864, 1899, 1907) and Hague (1899, 1907) Conventions 
setting out the obligations of states to allow for the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
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sick, wounded, and captured soldiers. In addition, the International Labour Organization was 
established following the First World War to develop labour regulations intended to protect 
workers’ rights, and the League of Nations introduced limited measures to protect ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious minorities in parts of Europe.5 Yet there was little effort by 
governments to adopt a formal system of internationally recognized human rights. This 
situation changed dramatically in the wake of the mass atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi 
government and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations and its affiliated 
agencies. The decolonization movement of the 1950s and 1960s also contributed to the 
historical circumstances inspiring the formation of human rights law in international affairs.  
 
The contemporary human rights regime that developed concurrently with and under the 
auspices of the United Nations system constitutes a set of norms, institutions, and procedures 
that most states now accept as binding to some degree.6 The Preamble to the UN Charter 
states that the fundamental objectives of the UN are partly to “reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small.” Article 1 of the Charter states that the UN is also 
intended to achieve international cooperation in “promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.”7 Although the Charter refers to human rights in several places, it does 
not define what those rights are. Thus one of the first tasks the UN assumed was to draft a 
document that would specify consensually-agreed human rights norms, a task delegated to 
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt.8 The work of the 
CHR resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which according to its 
Preamble serves as a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”9 The 
UDHR was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. 
Because the UDHR is a resolution and not a treaty, it is not legally binding. However, over 
time the majority of the provisions of the UDHR have come to be accepted as part of 
customary international law.10 In addition, the UDHR has been supplemented by two treaties 
that, when ratified by signatory states, give human rights binding force in international law, 
both of which were adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and entered into law in 1976: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). States parties to these and 
other human rights treaties assume primary responsibility for protecting and enforcing the 
rights of individuals within their jurisdiction, under the supervision of the UN as well as 
numerous regional and intergovernmental bodies, while individuals and NGOs have 
secondary responsibility to critique state practices when these violate or fail to promote 
human rights.11 Indeed, one of the primary concerns of international human rights law is to 
encourage states to reform their political–legal systems in order to achieve the domestic 
guarantee of basic rights and freedoms. When differences between national and international 
standards do exist, the latter are supposed to supplement the former and in that way secure 
the same rights for all persons even though they live within different domestic jurisdictions. 
Since the adoption of the UDHR, the human rights system has expanded enormously, 
evolving new conceptions of rights and a multitude of declarations, conventions, and Charter-
based and treaty-based human rights bodies. Two notable developments include the creation 
of the position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993 and coordination of the 
Universal Periodic Review process—which monitors each member state’s fulfilment of its 
human rights obligations and commitments in a four year-cycle—by the Human Rights 
Council (successor to the Commission on Human Rights) since 2008.12 
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At the heart of the human rights system remains what is known as the “International Bill of 
Human Rights,” which consists of the UDHR together with the ICCPR and ICESCR. Both 
covenants proclaim that states must undertake to respect and ensure the following rights: to 
life and personal integrity and security; to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment; to freedom from coercion, slavery, and forced labor; to 
due process of law and to a humane and working penal system; to freedom to travel within 
and outside one’s country; to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression, assembly, 
and association; and to take part in the conduct of government and public affairs (including 
the right to vote and be elected). The dominant themes in the ICCPR are equality (equal 
treatment, equal protection of the law, equality of opportunity) and nondiscrimination on the 
bases of race, color, sex, language, religion, opinion, origin, birth, and status. In connection 
with nondiscrimination, members of minorities within states also are granted the rights, in 
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their culture, practice their religion, 
and use their language.13 
 
According to the ICESCR, states are supposed to take steps “individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation . . . to the maximum of their available resources . . . 
with a view to achieving progressively full realization”14 of the following rights: to work; to 
just and favourable conditions of work, including leisure; to join trade unions and to strike; to 
social security; to social protection of the family, mothers, and children; to an adequate 
standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, housing, medical care, and social 
services; to the highest possible standards of physical and mental health; to education and 
training; and to take part in the cultural life of the community and benefit from any scientific 
progress therein. Again, the themes of equality and nondiscrimination are dominant in this 
Covenant. 
 
According to the standards established by the International Bill of Human Rights, human 
rights are to be both international and universal, applicable to all persons within and across 
states. In addition, basic or fundamental human rights are thought to be inviolable individual 
entitlements; in other words, they are supposed to work as superior norms, generally having 
priority when in conflict with other weighty norms, values or goals (e.g., the greater good), 
and resistant to cost-benefit trade-offs.15 The rights articulated in the International Bill are 
also viewed as interdependent and protective of a range of fundamental moral and public 
goods.16 Interdependent human rights embody aspects of both “negative” rights and 
“positive” rights. Negative rights are principles not to impede or coerce other individuals 
from participating in securing, protecting, and promoting the conditions in which they may 
exercise their rights. Positive rights are principles to aid and cooperate with other individuals 
in securing, protecting, and promoting the conditions in which they may exercise their 
fundamental rights and liberties. Civil and political rights are sometimes characterized as 
negative rights insofar as they entail the freedom of individuals from governmental 
interference. Economic, social, and cultural rights are frequently characterized as positive 
rights insofar as they require the promotion of governmental policies designed to create the 
social conditions that enable individuals to exercise their rights and freedoms effectively. It is 
clear, though, that effective enjoyment of civil and political rights often requires state 
assistance providing for the basic socio-economic rights of individuals—such as food, 
education, health, and shelter—while the progressive realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights requires safeguards against the possible abuse of supporting civil–political 
rights—such as the right to life, freedom of speech, due process of law, and political 
participation—by the actions of government.17 Furthermore, a concern with community and 
cultural pluralism is expressed in the UN human rights framework: the International Bill 
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recognizes a number of human rights that must be exercised by individuals as members of 
different racial, ethnic, economic and religious groups, in the understanding that membership 
and participation in those groups are essential to a life of dignity. Thus, the right of 
individuals in a community with others to practice and observe their religion is an integral 
part of freedom of religion and might forbid establishing measures on the part of the state 
whose effects are the impairment of that right. Of special importance are the cultural rights of 
minority cultures within multinational states; thus, Article 27 of the ICCPR ensures to 
members of those cultures in community with others the right to preserve their distinctive 
language, religion and, ultimately, their “way of life.”18 
 
The human rights system continues to develop and change over time in response to various 
social, cultural, political, and economic concerns while retaining its aspiration of mitigating 
injustice and abuses of state power. The International Bill is now complemented by a number 
of “core” human rights treaties that address, inter alia, the elimination of racial and gender 
discrimination, protection against torture and forced disappearance, and the rights of women, 
children, migrants, and persons with disabilities; each core treaty has its own committee of 
experts to monitor implementation of treaty obligations by its states parties. The core human 
rights treaties have been joined by numerous declarations of emerging entitlements, which 
may eventually become codified as legally-binding conventions. Most recently, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on September 13, 2007. Human rights norms also have penetrated into cognate 
areas of global politics that bear on individuals’ rights to be treated with humanity, including 
refugees and internally displaced people, genocide, forced labour, human trafficking, climate 
change, and global poverty. Thus, despite lacking strong enforcement mechanisms and 
sanctioning powers, the human rights system has not remained static. It is constantly 
changing, with states constructing new conceptions of the nature and content of rights, and 
devising new mechanisms for the promotion and protection of international standards in 
response to shifting global circumstances.19 
 
The moral architecture of international human rights 
The previous section established that since the end of the Second World War, the promotion 
and protection of human rights has rapidly assumed increased global salience. It is no 
exaggeration to suggest that the UDHR has become “the moral touchstone for all claims at 
the international level.”20 Indeed, in the Final Declaration and Programme of Action 
produced at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, more than 170 states 
endorsed the universality and indivisibility of human rights first articulated in the UDHR, 
confirmed the legitimacy of the global human rights regime, and reaffirmed the idea that “it is 
the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.”21 Consequently, there is today “not a single 
nation, culture or people that is not in one way or another enmeshed in human rights 
regimes.”22 Despite the troubling gaps that exist between human rights rhetoric and human 
rights abuses, a significant body of human rights law now occupies a prominent place in 
world politics. Human rights, however, are not only institutionalized legal standards. Such 
rights are properly called “human” rights because they furnish us with a critical vision of 
what it means to be human in society with others. Consequently, they are not simply a 
functional scheme for coherence of the international order but also possess their own 
normative content and potent trajectory. 
 
Aside from demonstrating the expansive role played by human rights at the international 
level, as well as indicating how claims for human rights have mushroomed since 1948, the 
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most important issue in the contemporary rights framework is the search for a shared 
understanding of the normative foundation(s) for human rights. This project has been 
surrounded by controversy, however, as the standards professed in the UDHR were 
conceived first and foremost as a set of practical norms amenable to political consensus 
between diverse peoples from all over the world. International human rights are, as Charles 
Beitz points out, a “public doctrine” arising from a “collective political enterprise.”23 The 
collection of rights contained in the International Bill is not expressly associated with any 
specific religious faith, metaphysical theory, or philosophical worldview, so that the list of 
rights in principle can be associated with and interpreted from a variety of traditions and 
perspectives.24 Attempts to ground human rights theoretically—that is, to provide justifiable 
reasons for why there are human rights at all and why they should be prized so highly—are 
thus characterized by philosophical heterogeneity and extrinsic tensions, but by considerable 
overlap as well. The vast and ongoing philosophical argument about the adequate grounds for 
human rights—ranging widely across “foundationalist” and “nonfoundationalist” 
approaches—is beyond the scope of this chapter.25 Such debates are crucial nonetheless to 
providing the dynamic for the continuing development of how human rights are both 
conceived and practiced, and demonstrate that there are in fact several possible bases to 
justify rights morally (which may also help prevent human rights from simply becoming a 
matter of dogma). While acknowledging the complexity of mediating among different 
justifications, this section will briefly set out a propositional grounding for human rights as 
provided by the French jurist René Cassin, one of the main drafters of the UDHR. Cassin 
compared the Declaration to the portico of a temple resting on four cornerstones 
corresponding to “dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood.”26 Cassin’s simple imagery of 
the architecture of the UDHR yields four interlocking principles that can be broadly agreed to 
underpin all categories of human rights, and which encapsulate the aspirations of people 
throughout history who have struggled against domination and for fundamental interests they 
deem vital for a properly human life. 
 
The first cornerstone of the human rights doctrine is the concept of human dignity.27 Most 
influentially, the Preamble to the UDHR states that “recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Article 1 reiterates the first principle that “all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”28 The idea of dignity adopted in 
the UDHR reflects a characteristically modern understanding of the intrinsic, inalienable 
worth of the individual as a human being. While the origin of the English term is found in the 
Latin word dignitas, meaning nobility of status attached to a role, rank, or office, the concept 
has been formulated in different ways throughout its intellectual history.29 In the classical 
natural law tradition, dignity designated a hierarchical distinction between what is worthy and 
unworthy, whether referencing a privileged aristocratic elite or certain types of conduct 
considered to be morally superior. Thus some people (e.g., a monarch or religious leader) and 
actions (e.g., donating charity) merit “worthiness” while others (e.g., profiting through deceit) 
do not. An important feature of this view is that it correlates dignity with morally obligatory 
duties, rather than to anything to which a person has a right as such. Yet the concept of 
dignity underwent a pivotal symbolic shift between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries 
under the influence of Renaissance humanism, coming to signify equal human worth 
attributed to all persons as opposed to unequal social rank bestowing superiority on some and 
inferiority on others.30 Immanuel Kant (echoing Cicero) played a key role in this 
metamorphosis with his deontological injunction to treat “humanity” always “as an end, 
never merely as a means.”31 Kant’s account emphasizes that all human beings have an 
intrinsic moral worth entirely independent of their position in a social hierarchy, which 
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should never be violated by treating them as if they are potentially usable means to an end. 
The Kantian idea of respect for human dignity became the central insight behind the modern 
natural rights tradition—namely, that the inviolability of human dignity correlates to the 
inviolability of a person’s moral rights—before then informing the human rights discourse to 
the point that the two concepts now are seen to be inseparable.32 On the one hand, to respect a 
person means to respect their human rights while, on the other hand, to violate a person’s 
rights is to violate their human dignity; rights violations, in other words, connote a sense of 
indignation, humiliation, or degradation in particularly egregious cases of mistreatment. 
 
This connection between human dignity and human rights is reiterated in the ICCPR and 
ICESCR. The Preambles to both Covenants affirm that “the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family . . . derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”33 
Importantly, then, the notion of dignity as treating each human being with the respect they 
deserve serves not only as the principal normative justification for all human rights but, 
further, as a yardstick against which to set the relevant conditions whereby everyone may 
enjoy civil and political as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. One such essential 
and defining condition is equality.34 The principle of equality implied by statements equating 
equal worth with equal rights contains two elements: the formal and the substantive (or 
material). Formal equality follows from the nondiscrimination provision in Articles 2 and 7 
of the UDHR, which affirms that everyone is entitled to human rights without distinction of 
any kind, such as nationality, race, religion, age, gender, sexual orientation, economic 
background, or disability. Formal equality thus concerns itself with ensuring that legal and 
political processes provide equal protection to all citizens, prohibiting discriminatory policies 
that arbitrarily deny the rights of some or accord special treatment to the rights of others. The 
value of formal equality lies, in part, in the way it draws our attention to the prevalence of 
differences between people in society, and supports the contention that respect for human 
rights means all rights-holders ought to be treated equally. Substantive equality reflects the 
fact that social conditions exhibit systemic patterns of inequality that persist over time, which 
may arbitrarily disadvantage some individuals by undermining their prospects for exercising 
rights in a manner that is meaningfully equal to those with greater material advantages. Many 
international human rights instruments therefore promote positive duties on the state to 
remedy preexisting disadvantages, provide equality of opportunity, and uphold a cluster of 
interrelated rights meant to establish minimum conditions needed to achieve a dignified 
human existence, including primary education, adequate subsistence, basic healthcare, fair 
remuneration in employment, and social security.35 Formal and substantive equality 
sometimes overlap and sometimes compete within human rights discourse and practice, of 
course, suggesting that equality remains a fragile and contested norm. Liberal and socialist 
theorists, for instance, have frequently (and often unproductively) debated the relative 
priority of formal and material equality, and many countries adopting neoliberal market-
based economic policies oppose the redistributive consequences implied by socio-economic 
rights.36 
 
The third cornerstone of liberty associates dignity and rights with the human capacity to 
freely choose what to do and to be in the autonomous conduct of our lives, a capacity deemed 
by many to be central to the moral status of personhood.37 The principle of liberty reflects an 
image of “the ideal of free human beings,” as expressed in the preambles to the ICCPR and 
ICESCR.38 The appeal to liberty as a condition to which all humans are entitled is one of the 
most compelling claims within human rights discourse, regularly serving as a powerful and 
indeed revolutionary platform for social struggles against innumerable forms of subordination 
and domination; historically, the right to liberty repeatedly appears as the right to liberation 
7 
 
or emancipation.39 The moral demand of respect for individual freedom comprises both 
negative and positive liberty. On the one hand, it means being free from unwarranted external 
constraints on or coercive interference with our life plans, choices, beliefs, and goods. Being 
free from slavery, torture, and arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile represents basic negative 
liberties. But on the other hand, liberty also requires being free to pursue possible courses of 
action, to exercise powers of choice, and to achieve preferred goals or ends to which one 
aspires, provided such actions are compatible with the equal liberties of others.40 The kind of 
liberty at issue in the human rights framework also has a dual aspect, looking simultaneously 
to the private and the public freedoms of all persons. Hence the rights enumerated in the 
International Bill include freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as freedom of 
movement, freedom to organize politically, freedom of speech and press, and freedom to vote 
and take part in government. Taken together, the negative and positive, and the private and 
public, facets of liberty ground a cluster of rights that aim to secure both freedom from 
oppression as well as the means and opportunities for exercising self-transforming activity 
(whether individually or in association with others).41 
 
The final cornerstone of the human rights structure is controversial and elusive, yet it has 
proved indispensable to widening the idea of human rights in general. “Fraternity” entered 
the lexicon of rights with the French Revolution of 1789 and subsequently inspired 
widespread demands for social inclusion in the spirit of human unity. This universalist vision 
of unity amongst the peoples of all countries on the basis of common concerns, goals, or 
activity—popularized in the nineteenth century by the motto “Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro 
uno” (“One for all, all for one”)—was later taken up by Article 1 of the UDHR, which 
declares that all human beings “should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”42 
The idea of universal “brotherliness” is now usually embodied in the language of solidarity.43 
Solidarity has often been regarded as an arbitrary affective force in contemporary political 
thought, one that is either too weak to promote the constitutional juridification of rights, or 
that, in its emotive volatility, is a threat to stable social cohesion.44 There can be little doubt 
that the great rallying cry of solidarity has a certain revolutionary allure capable of inspiring 
fierce antagonism towards political and economic systems regarded as gross affronts to 
human dignity. Nevertheless, the quest for solidarity is predominantly empowering; it can 
motivate sentiments of togetherness conducive to political action between people who are 
situated differently in the world and foster collective commitments to progressive social 
transformation that may advance the cause of justice—even across territorial boundaries.45 
Solidarity’s international or transnational role in human rights is seen in Article 28 of the 
UDHR: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”46 By incorporating solidarity as 
an essential entitlement for the achievement of a suitably just world society, normative 
human rights discourse identifies solidarity as a two-way street: states should not only think 
of human rights in terms of costs and benefits for themselves but also in larger terms of 
collective goods applied to the world as a whole. States therefore should choose to work with 
each other—assuming shared responsibility for cooperative human rights schemes—in order 
to achieve outcomes ultimately beneficial to humanity as a whole. The 1986 Declaration on 
the Right to Development, for example, holds that states “have the duty to co-operate with 
each other . . . to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, [and] mutual interest.”47 Similar concerns for reciprocal normativity 
animated decolonial struggles for independence and the right to self-determination, and 
continue to stimulate transnational movements for post-imperial social justice linking the 
Global North and South.48 Solidarity, then, may be interpreted as not only a right in itself but 
as one of the social conditions supporting the realization of all other human rights. 
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Struggles for dignity and the politics of rights recognition 
The moral edifice of the international human rights system rests upon the main pillars of 
dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity. In political terms, however, the challenge for 
human rights is not simply to presume a dignity intrinsic to the self but to make oneself 
recognized by others. Political struggles for human rights exploit precisely this ambiguity: 
they might articulate a perfectly intelligible claim to dignity in the abstract, but the key is to 
gain public recognition and acknowledgement from a community of others of what in 
practice turns out to be palpably concrete identities—often based on a combination of 
intersecting characteristics—and particular situations of grievance. Although formally an 
assertion of antecedent moral principles, the politics of human rights points to the fact that 
rights claims are performative acts whereby the claimant opens up a public scene of 
persuasion, negotiation, and diffusion through which rights themselves are engendered, 
practiced, and, when successful, accepted by those to whom the claims are addressed.49 The 
notion of performativity has its conceptual origins in the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin, 
according to which the performance of linguistic utterances (such as rights claims) is a 
species of action.50 On the performative position, rights claiming practices have the potential 
to disrupt and transform conventional understandings of self, other, and community—in other 
words, to shift prevailing meanings of who we are as plural human beings, thereby 
foregrounding questions of inclusion and exclusion.51 A performative understanding of the 
activity of rights claiming thus sees rights, as well as human dignity, as intersubjective 
political achievements between people rather than subjective possessions within them. These 
achievements should be regarded as only ever provisionally settled, however, and always 
subject to “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which 
universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and 
positioned throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil 
society.”52 
 
Human rights claims, therefore, are not simply invocations of a priori norms but performative 
utterances of particular normative meanings and beliefs within the relational contexts of 
social coexistence. On this view, rights morph from being fixed objects possessed by 
essential subjects to being dynamic social practices through which rights and the subjects 
who claim them are mutually constituted.53 Revisions of our moral–political identities go 
hand in hand with ongoing refigurations of the normative values of dignity, liberty, equality, 
and solidarity. Consider how myriad members of racial, religious, sexual, or ethnic minorities 
deemed of unequal worth and standing have rhetorically reshaped understandings and 
practices of equality through particular deployments of human rights language across space 
and time, repositioning themselves from “outside” to “inside” humanity. Hence mutual 
recognition between different individuals as subjects with rights to be respected, protected, 
and fulfilled within political communities is, I suggest, the first political step toward the 
active realization of human dignity. The dynamic process of mutual recognition, in other 
words, underscores how practices of making (and, for that matter, unmaking) the value and 
status of human dignity are pervasive features of our political lives with others. 
 
Performative theory points us towards paying closer attention to how speech-acts accomplish, 
rather than merely represent, the core principles of dignity, liberty, equality, and solidarity on 
which human rights rely. In so doing, it challenges two recurring assumptions in the history 
of thinking about human rights: first, that rights are “free-floating” values that operate 
external to social, symbolic, and institutional contexts; and second, that once rights claims 
have been established they will remain permanently fixed or securely perpetuated over time. 
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Neither assumption does proper justice to the extent to which successful rights claims emerge 
out of and are shaped by concrete historical struggles—whether it be against racism, sex and 
gender discrimination, economic exploitation, or oppression—and the degree to which they 
remain relatively effective only when rearticulated and repositioned by future socio-political 
interventions. Emphasizing how achieving human rights and the situated struggles for 
dignity, equality, liberty, and solidarity are intertwined, highlights the way in which the 
concept of “recognition” is at the heart of the political dimension of human rights. One of the 
advantages of rooting human rights in social processes of recognition is that it frames the 
condition of being human, and therefore of human dignity, as a political status, that is, as an 
achievement of existing experience rather than a mere natural object. 
 
Taking its cue from Hegel’s famous depiction of the master–slave dialectic in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit,54 the model of social recognition posits that the identity and agency 
of the subject is established in the context of intersubjective relations with others. Herein, not 
only is consciousness and identity shaped through dialectical mediations of self and other, but 
our sense of self-worth is tied to the ways in which others recognize us and how we recognize 
others. This implies that the freedom and dignity of both self and other arises through 
reciprocal affirmation of symmetrical claims to equal recognition and respect. The broader 
point is that the type of egalitarian relationship necessary for enacting and enjoying human 
rights claims presupposes empowering individuals as equal peers in political representation, 
participation, and decision-making.55 The “vital human need” for recognition, as Charles 
Taylor puts it,56 thus extends to acknowledging not only the presumed equal worth of 
individuals but even more so to what Joel Feinberg refers to as their “recognizable capacity to 
assert claims” regarded as socially meaningful or institutionally legitimate.57 Axel Honneth 
contends that rights are “depersonalized symbols of social respect.”58 What this means is that 
human rights express a general public recognition that particular human beings are deserving 
of—that is, entitled to—the political and legal status of rights-bearers; this is another way of 
rendering Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “right to have rights.”59 Arendt’s point is that the 
subject of human rights, as an agent capable of enacting rights claims, does not exist in the 
abstract but as a fellow person acknowledged as such by others within a shared web of legal 
and political practices that implement equality. Thus the performance of due recognition of 
equal status is an action indispensable to individuals developing a sense of self-respect as 
responsible political agents. As Honneth argues, public recognition constitutes an experience 
in which “one is able to view oneself as a person who shares with all other members of one’s 
community the qualities that make participation” possible.60 
 
This brings us to another crucial insight regarding the relationship between recognition and 
rights, centered on the problem of political inclusion and exclusion. While social recognition 
denotes the positive experience of reciprocally extending due respect to the equal status, 
dignity, and rights of others, it also implies the negative experience of misrecognition, to wit, 
the failure to value individuals and their rights or to recognize them only in a way that 
ignores, distorts, or devalues their social, political, and personal experiences. Honneth 
identifies three pivotal experiences of asymmetric misrecognition or “disrespect”: abuse, 
torture and other violations of physical integrity; denigration of individual or collective ways 
of life and cultural practices; and denial of equal rights and of equal standing as a full-fledged 
member of a political community.61 Misrecognition is most injurious to socially vulnerable 
individuals and groups: the poor and destitute; racial, ethnic, and religious minorities; women 
and children; the disabled; and gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people (as well as to 
those who may be several of these simultaneously). Those who are not recognized in terms of 
dominant identities often are regarded as inferior, defective, threatening, or of being 
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otherwise essentially constituted in a way that makes them less deserving of equal respect and 
status. In contrast, a critical recognition approach argues that possessing human rights is not 
“a matter of being constituted in a certain way” but “of being afforded a certain sort of social 
recognition” that acknowledges our constitutive differences as being compatible with 
establishing political equality.62 This is because any attempt to specify the underlying generic 
properties of what it is to be a human being will almost inevitably exclude “some groups of 
humans [who] fail to meet the criteria.”63 One of the most important insights that Honneth 
offers is that the experience of misrecognition can inaugurate resistance and social 
movements demanding the expansion of relations of mutual recognition and political 
inclusion. The search for recognition is an irrepressible motivational impetus for the 
subordinated and excluded to challenge hierarchical deprivations of dignity and rights by 
means of the very act of claiming to be equal.64 
 
An example of the pivotal importance of this performative moral grammar of struggles for 
recognition—which is another way of describing the demand for equal humanity and equal 
rights by the excluded themselves—can be seen in the fight for access to essential 
antiretroviral medicines by South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). TAC 
emerged in 1998 as part of both the transnational movement for universal healthcare justice 
and the human right to health, and the grass roots campaign for access to adequate medical 
treatment and essential medicines on behalf of HIV-infected individuals in South Africa.65 
Combining rights-based public interest litigation with assorted performative devices such as 
symbolic positioning, ethical–political narratives, and publicly engaged argumentation, TAC 
mounted a compelling drive for the production of and importation into South Africa of 
affordable generic medicines.66 By positioning itself as a successor to the antiapartheid 
struggle, TAC invoked a powerful narrative that recollected a defiant people united in 
solidarity against social injustice and political subordination. Moreover, they also portrayed 
those needing antiretroviral drugs as concurrently embodying the basic principles of “human 
dignity, equality and freedom” applicable to all citizens under the new South African 
Constitution,67 as well as the distinctive vulnerabilities of specific communities of people 
living with HIV/AIDS, such as pregnant women and homeless children. Finally, out of a 
belief that structural change, such as expanding the scope of healthcare delivery, is unlikely 
to be achieved without also affecting “hearts and minds,” TAC deployed rhetorical devices, 
such as when Nelson Mandela famously wore a TAC t-shirt at one of their demonstrations in 
2002, dramatizing the figurative transformation of racist, sexist, homophobic, and other 
discriminatory stereotypes. With the help of these performative acts, TAC provided a 
significant material and symbolic connection with the public that enabled a stigmatized 
section of South African society to repudiate an imposed sense of inferiority as to their status 
in society and move forward as equal human rights-bearing agents in the political realm. 
 
Such examples can be multiplied in many other contexts and from various different 
perspectives: India’s Dalits leveraging an international network of solidarity NGOs to 
challenge local and national caste-based discrimination;68 San farm workers in Namibia 
asserting labour and housing rights against institutional attempts to anchor their group 
identity to a traditional hunting and gathering lifestyle;69 LGBTQIA activist coalitions in all 
world regions, including Southeast Asia, contesting multiple forms of “heteronormative” 
exclusion and violence on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity;70 Colombian 
activists using “people’s tribunals” to publicize peasant land dispossession and violence 
against indigenous communities committed by state-linked paramilitaries and multinational 
corporations;71 and more than 200 NGOs helping to create a Women’s Court in Sarajevo, 
giving women a public space to tell about their experiences of rape and sexual violence 
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during the wars in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, thereby empowering them as 
legal and political right-holders and not simply passive victims.72 The striking resonance with 
the politics of recognition as an enactment of equal human status, dignity, and rights is clear. 
Each of these struggles for rights and recognition was at pains to show that rights violations 
also should be seen as lived experiences of misrecognition that demonstrate a lack of respect 
and concern for the dignity of those affected. Hence, misrecognition involves a symbolic 
devaluation of the very idea of shared humanity. The performative features of the search for 
recognition illustrate, therefore, that successful recognition of equal human rights depends, 
however precariously, upon reciprocal acknowledgement of equal and inclusive belonging 
between self and other.73 In this way recognition amounts to a social practice which brings 
into existence the very rights the act of claiming aspires to achieve. 
 
Conclusion 
Because of their discursive elasticity and pragmatic availability, human rights claims have 
been expanded into the social, political, and legal entitlements of previously excluded 
individuals and groups since the end of the Second World War. This chapter sought to clarify 
that human rights function simultaneously as an institutional–legal scheme, a moral–
normative stance, and a social–political struggle. In all these forms, the prominence of the 
contemporary quest for human rights is attributable to the degree to which it has affected not 
only the domestic and international conduct and policies of states, but also the practices and 
influence of a constantly expanding range of nongovernmental organizations, advocacy 
groups, and social movements committed to an assortment of human rights causes. At the 
same time, I have underscored that the strength and effectiveness of any human rights 
ascription depends on performative practices of seeking and extending reciprocal recognition 
of equal human status. In many ways, human rights represent performative figurations for 
portraying what it means to live a dignified human existence or, conversely, what it means to 
suffer unacceptable dehumanizing indignities in our relations with others. Rather than 
signalling a single, unchanging human nature untouched by the realities of social coexistence, 
human rights embody ethical and political practices that human beings constantly work out 
for accepting and engaging with one another on equal terms. For this reason, analyses of 
human rights also must reckon with the fact that the normative, political, and institutional 
elaborations of rights will always exceed their empirical manifestations; struggles in support 
of particular human rights will always be confronted with strong countertendencies and 
outright refusals and will never yield a final, straightforward triumph. From the perspective 
offered here, however, the power of human rights is less a matter of definitive success than 
the pervasive capacity of subjects to undertake continually evolving practices of declaring, 
negotiating, and recognizing their specific claims to liberty, equality, solidarity, and dignity. 
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